For over a month, since the beginning of April 2024, Georgia’s capital city of Tbilisi has witnessed anti-government protests by mostly younger citizens in the run-up to the events of 14 May, when the Georgian parliament passed a “foreign agent” bill at its third and final reading, with 84 votes for and 30 against. This new law requires the media, non-governmental and other civic non-profit organisations to register as “pursuing the interests of a foreign power” if they receive more than 20 per cent of their funding from abroad. They would also be monitored by the Justice Ministry and required to share sensitive information if deemed necessary, facing heavy fines if they fail to do so. The day before it was passed, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze stated that failure to support the bill would threaten Georgia’s sovereignty. On the other hand, Salome Zourabichvili, Georgia’s pro-Western President since 2018, said she would veto the bill, although her powers are limited, and any presidential veto can be overridden by a simple parliamentary majority.
Opponents of the foreign agent bill have described it as “the Russian law”, likening it to similar legislation that was signed into law by President Putin in July 2012, and claiming that it threatens press and civic freedoms. Upon its passage, scuffles immediately broke out in the parliamentary chamber, reflecting strongly held differences of opinion. The Georgian government itself likened the law to America’s own Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) 1938. Georgia’s new law was not well received in Brussels and Washington. The law was deemed incompatible with Georgia’s bid for membership of the EU, which is set to decide this December on the formal launch of accession talks. The European Council only granted Georgia official candidate status for the EU on 8 November 2023, after an initial refusal in June 2022, when Ukraine and Moldova were granted candidate status while Georgia’s candidacy was made conditional on progress in 12 areas.
The ruling pro-Russian Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012, and was last re-elected in 2020. The party was founded by Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire oligarch who made his fortune in Russia in the 1990s. Pro-Western Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) was defeated in October 2012 and Ivanishvili thereupon briefly served as Prime Minister. Since then, he has influenced Georgian politics from behind the scenes, as the nation walks a tightrope between its pursuit of EU membership and the resetting of its relations with Russia.
The events in Georgia reflect differences of opinion regarding its respective relations with Russia and the West. Georgia and Russia have a shared history, as shown by most recently by Georgia’s inclusion in the Russian Empire (1801-1918) and then in the Soviet Union (1922-1991). A most visible reminder of Georgia’s place within the Soviet Union is provided by the dominating figure of Joseph Stalin, born in Georgia as Josif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili. Soon after Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991, it chose to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1993, thereby staying within the Russian sphere of influence. In December 2000, Georgia became the first and only member of the CIS to require visas to travel to Russia.
Russian-backed President Eduard Shevardnadze, a former Soviet minister of foreign affairs, was ousted by the non-violent Rose Revolution of November 2003, following which Mikheil Saakashvili took over as President in January 2004. A new national flag, coat of arms, and national anthem-Tavisupleba (Freedom) were adopted in May 2004. Following the five-day Russo-Georgian War of August 2008, Russia recognised the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which account for some 20 per cent of internationally recognised Georgian territory, as independent states. Georgia and Russia have not had formal diplomatic relations ever since, although trade and travel between the two countries have gradually resumed since 2012. The EU remains Georgia’s main trade partner.
Georgia’s informal links with its northern neighbour are reflected, among other things, in a continuing influx of Russian tourists and in exports of Georgian wine to Russia, accounting for 65 per cent of total wine exports as of 2023. Georgia has also not imposed economic sanctions on Russia following the launch of its Special Military Operation in Ukraine in February 2022, nor provided any non-military assistance to Ukraine. Russia revoked visa requirements for Georgian nationals and restored direct flights between the two countries, after a four-year suspension, in May 2023. Georgia had waived the visa requirement for Russians back in 2012.
Georgia’s strategic location in the South Caucasus, at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, makes it a geopolitically important buffer state between Russia to the north and Türkiye, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to the south. There are particular implications for energy supply to the EU, Eurasian trade routes, and security in the Black Sea. In an increasingly polarised and divided world, the political direction Georgia takes will be of particular interest to those who seek rapprochement, rather than increasing conflict, between Russia and the West. The balance between the relative strengths of Georgia’s European and Russian allegiances, and the perceived threats to Russia from Georgia’s potential membership of the EU and NATO will undoubtedly help determine the eventual outcome for the region.
Ashis Banerjee