Military preparedness, as part of “whole-of-society” civilian-military resilience, is vital to ensure national security at a time of global political instability. The UK Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR), ‘Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad’, was thus officially launched by Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer at Govan Shipyard in Glasgow on 2 June 2025. Over the preceding ten months, the leaders of the review-Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (former NATO Secretary-General), General (retired) Sir Richard Barrons, and Dr Fiona Hill, a foreign policy expert- drew upon the expertise of the ‘Defence Review Team 6’ and sought responses from as many as 1,700 individuals, political parties, and organisations, as well as 150 senior experts. The reviewers worked within the budgetary constraints of the Government’s plans to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP from 2027 onwards. Their resulting 144-page report details Britain’s plans to respond to “a new era of threat”. The Government has since promised to implement all its 62 recommendations. Ongoing armed conflicts elsewhere in the world, a reduction in US support for NATO, and the imperative for UK defence spending to rise in line with NATO’s requirements have all served as drivers for the UK’s “Plan for Change for Defence.”
The aim is to create a “more lethal” and tech-enabled Integrated UK Defence Force, combining conventional, nuclear, and Special Forces-one that is better equipped to deal with contemporary conflict in all five domains of warfare (maritime, land, air, space, and cyber and electromagnetic). The three core Defence roles encompass the UK, its Overseas Territories, and Crown Dependencies; the Euro-Atlantic; and the global security environment. The reorganised Defence Force comprises the Department of State, the National Armaments Director (NAD) Group, Military Strategic Headquarters (MSHQ), and the Defence Nuclear Organisation (DNO). Defence’s overseas network will be consolidated as an Integrated Global Network (IGDN), under a single command. The ‘NATO First’ policy prioritises British commitment to protecting the Euro-Atlantic area and to support its forward presence further East, in Estonia and Poland. Meanwhile, partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region (AUKUS) and in the Middle East will be supported as part of a ‘not NATO Only’ strategy.
The all-important Defence-industry partnership will be strengthened through the Defence Industrial Strategy and a “segmented approach to procurement.” The collaborative efforts of an expanded military-industrial complex will focus on the various technologies that are “redefining warfare”, including artificial intelligence, robotics (drones), precision weapons, directed energy weapons, hypersonic missiles, space-based capabilities, quantum computing, and engineering biology. Innovations in defence and dual-purpose technologies can be expected to boost economic growth. On the other hand, threats to cybersecurity can disrupt critical infrastructure and have a negative impact on economic activity, requiring a new CyberEM Command to counter cyber-attacks.
To better serve a maritime nation, a “New Hybrid Navy” will be created, including a ‘hybrid’ carrier airwing. A “credible, independent UK nuclear deterrent” will be operated by the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE), boosted by upgraded nuclear warheads and nuclear-powered attack submarines. The UK can no longer rely on its US-built Trident missile system of four Vanguard class nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines, one of which is currently deployed at all times as part of the Continuous at Sea Deterrent.
As it stands, Britain’s armed forces are said to be unprepared for major conflict in the North Atlantic region. Workforce planning, to ensure the right mix of Regulars, Reserves, and civil servants, is key to the successful operation of the new UK Defence Force. Recruitment and retention, focused training and education offers, expanded Cadet Forces, Australian-style ‘gap years’, and modernised Armed Forces accommodation will help boost numbers in the services. Chronic underinvestment in the Strategic Base of infrastructure (airports, seaports, warehouses, mounting centres), movement assets (trains, shipping), and transportation of troops and materiel will also have to be remedied.
The SDR is an aspirational document, responsive to current geopolitics and the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century. Words will, however, have to be backed up by meaningful actions. Given competing public spending priorities on the NHS and schools, the Chancellor’s tight fiscal rules, and lack of detail on increased defence spending plans, future tax increases remain a distinct possibility if the SDR’s aspirations are to be fulfilled.
Ashis Banerjee