The American/Israeli War with Iran: An Attempt at Making Sense of a Major Conflict, with Global Implications, in the Middle East

 President Donald J. Trump has declared war on Iran. In keeping with his inimitable modus operandi, Trump took to his social media platform, Truth Social, in an 8-minute-long video on 28 February 2026, to announce “major combat operations”-a euphemism for war- against his arch-nemesis. During the early hours of the same day, the US and Israel launched coordinated pre-emptive air strikes on Iran, in Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion, respectively. Hostilities began despite reports of satisfactory progress in Omani-mediated indirect nuclear talks between the US and Iran in Geneva, which were due to resume in Vienna on 2 March. These talks may have served as a smokescreen for America’s real intentions, as they took place on the background of an American military build-up in the Middle East since early January 2026, reportedly the largest since the 2003 Iraq War.

 War has been declared without Congressional approval, as normally required under the ‘Declaration of War Clause’ in Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the US Constitution, at a time where there seems to be little appetite for yet another foreign war among most American citizens, including many “America First” MAGA members of Trump’s loyal electoral base. The War Powers Act of 1973, passed despite the then-President’s “objections”, also restricts the Commander-in-Chief ‘s ability to declare war without consultation. According to Section 3 of the Act: “The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”

Trump’s actions are a significant departure from George W. Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq, which had widespread public support and overwhelming bipartisan Congressional approval, although not backed by the UN Security Council. On this occasion, the war on Iran can be seen as a Republican war, supported by a solitary Democratic Senator in Congress. The Trump administration claims to have identified an “imminent threat” to the US from Iran, which seems somewhat strange as it coincides with the aforementioned and ongoing nuclear talks. Israel’s concerns relate to existential threats from a “global hub of terrorism”, Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and the imperative to remove that nation’s repressive leadership. It must be noted in this context that Iran is yet to become a nuclear power, unlike its opponents in the present conflict. Trump’s unilateral declaration of war has energised the unlikely partnership of Representatives Ro Khanna (Democrat-California) and Thomas Massie (Republican-Kentucky) to introduce a bipartisan War Powers Resolution in the House of Representatives, with the hope of imposing legislative brakes on President Trump’s military ambitions.

Any uncertainties over Trump’s strategic endgame were put to rest when he confirmed, in another video released on 1 March, that the US was there for “four weeks or less” to fulfil its ambitious objectives, which include preventing nuclear weapon production by Iran, obliteration of its ballistic missile programme and its naval forces, and, above all, regime change. In Trump’s own words, “an Iranian regime armed with long-range missiles and nuclear weapons would be a dire threat to every American.” This particular assertion makes little sense, as Trump claimed that Iran’s major nuclear facilities had been “obliterated” during the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June 2025. The President also expects the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the army, and the police to join a popular uprising by anti-regime Iranians, and to then rebuild the nation-an outcome which cannot be guaranteed under any circumstances.  Some cynics believe that conflict in the Middle East will inevitably divert attention from damaging revelations following the partial release of the Epstein files.

The first wave of US-Israeli attacks on Iran can be considered a success from the viewpoint of the military coalition, having started the process of ‘decapitation’ of Iran’s leadership. Prominent casualties among the forty or so of Iran’s top leaders who were killed on 28 February include Ayatollah Ali Khameini (Supreme Leader since 1989), Aziz Nasirzadeh (Minister of Defence), Major General Mohammad Pakpour (commander -in-chief of the IRGC), Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani (Secretary of the Supreme Defence Council), and Mahmoud Ahmedinejad (former President of the Islamic Republic). Military infrastructure in and around the cities of Tehran, Isfahan, Karaj, Kermanshah, Lorestan, Tabriz, and Qom came under fire from Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles. These targets are concentrated in the north and west of the country. In an unimaginable tragedy, a primary girls’ school, adjacent to an IRGC barracks in the southern city of Minab in Hormozgan province, was hit, killing at least 165 people and injuring 96 others.

Iran’s response has been hostile and uncompromising. Operation Truthful Promise 4 was heralded by the raising of the symbolic Red Flag of Revenge over the dome of the Jamkaran Mosque in Qom. Iranian ballistic missiles and drones have targeted Israel, US bases in the Gulf States (Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman), Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan, and even an RAF base in Cyprus. Israel’s missile defence systems (Iron Dome, Arrow-3, David’s Sling) appear to have been overwhelmed at times by Iranian saturation attacks. Under the circumstances, the Gulf Cooperation Council has displayed admirable restraint, despite the damage to several civilian targets from Iranian airborne attacks. Pro-regime protests have spread beyond Iran’s borders, to Iraq and Pakistan- both countries with large Shia minorities. An attack on the US Consulate in Karachi has led to at least ten deaths at the hands of the Pakistani security forces. The first American deaths, those of three members of the armed service, were reported on 1 March.  This particular news will not be well received in the US, especially after President Trump warned that more Americans are likely to be killed as the conflict intensifies. Many will recall that he promised during his electoral campaign not to sacrifice American lives in foreign wars.

Meanwhile, Ali Larijani has taken charge in his capacity as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, and a potential new Supreme Leader, subject to election has been identified in the person of Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the deceased Grand Ayatollah. A three-member temporary leadership council has also been set up, in preparation for the transition. Iran is refusing to enter into any further negotiations with the US.

The Iran war is already proving to be rather disruptive. Airspaces have been closed, planes have been grounded, commercial flights have been cancelled, the internet has been disrupted, embassies have been shuttered, international travellers have been stranded, and foreign residents are being evacuated from various parts of the Middle East. Israel is in a nationwide special state of emergency, until 12 March in the first instance unless the military campaign were to end before that date.  The Strait of Hormuz, a geographic choke point through which 20% of the world’s crude oil and 25% of its liquefied natural gas is normally shipped, has come to a standstill and is being bypassed wherever possible. Shipping costs, and oil and gas prices, are rising and stock markets are reacting badly.

American attempts at regime change in Iran are bringing back memories of previous failed interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Iran is itself not an ethnically homogeneous and politically united country. Apart from the Persian majority, which accounts for 60% of the population, Iran’s citizens include Azerbaijanis, Baloch, Kurds, Lurs, and others whose aspirations do not necessarily align with those of the majority. There is also no evidence of a coordinated and credible opposition within Iran, although the Persian diaspora, as might be expected, are mostly anti-regime and favour the leadership of Reza Pahlavi, scion of the short-lived Pahlavi dynasty and son of the deposed Shah. Bringing about regime change through popular uprising risks chronic political turmoil in Iran, factional infighting and even civil war, the possibility of military dictatorship, not to mention a potential refugee crisis. Superior American and Israeli military firepower and precision airstrikes, without a commitment to troops on the ground, will not suffice, especially in the absence of a clear, long-term plan to restore and maintain democracy in Iran. It seems appropriate to end with a phrase from the Old Testament: “For they have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind.” (Hosea 8:7).

Ashis Banerjee