The State Visit of King Charles III to America: Salvaging the Anglo-American “Special Relationship”
King Charles III, on his 20th visit to the US and also his first as reigning British monarch and head of the Commonwealth, addressed a joint session of the 119th US Congress on 28 April, 2026. In so doing, he became the second British monarch to address “this citadel of democracy”, appropriately during the year of the 250th anniversary of the American Declaration of Independence. King Charles followed his mother, Queen Elizabeth II, who had addressed Congress in May 1991 during her third state visit. King Charles’s 20-minute speech was particularly well-received, eliciting 13 standing ovations in a rare display of Congressional bipartisan Congressional approval of his dignified, considered, measured, and at times humorous, oratory, which was reminiscent of a previous and more refined era of public discourse. Even President Trump was appreciative and felt “very jealous.”
King Charles referred to “common democratic, legal, and social traditions” and a “bond of kinship and identity”; drew attention to the “Two Georges”: George Washington and King George III; and referred to “Kennedy’s soaring vision of an Atlantic partnership based on twin pillars: Europe and America.” At the same time, he did not hold back as he spoke about “differences” and “disagreements” with the US, and described a “more volatile and more dangerous” world. The King would have undoubtedly pleased Trump by confirming Britain’s commitment to “the biggest sustained increase in defence spending since the Cold War”, but probably less so by speaking up for the “defence of Ukraine” and “our shared responsibility to safeguard nature.” He spoke up for NATO at a time when Trump is actively considering leaving the military alliance that was only activated just the once, under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, in support of America in the aftermath of 9/11. King Charles’s citing of Magna Carta as “the foundation of the principle that executive power is subject to checks and balances”, was welcomed by Congressional Democrats but is unlikely to have similarly uplifted their Republican colleagues.
A “special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States” was unilaterally proclaimed by Winston Churchill, himself the progeny of an American mother, during his famous “Iron Curtain” speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946. Churchill referred to “the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world…which through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence.” This concept of a special relationship is based on a shared history-not always harmonious, a shared language-although not in the opinion of Oscar Wilde, cultural links, and common values.
It must be noted, in this context, that the majority of the Founding Fathers had English origins, while a smaller number had Scottish, Irish, Ulster-Scots, or Welsh roots. American independence in 1776 was not achieved through a peaceful handover of power. From the very outset, the nascent American Republic engaged in two wars with Britain: the American Revolutionary War of 1775-1783, and the War of 1812-1814. The British even covertly supported the Confederate States during the American Civil War of 1861-1865. The UK and US were, however, allied during both World Wars, in both instances after America belatedly joined in after military attacks on its own interest. After a period of isolationism early during the Second World War, America provided military supplies to the UK under the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941 before joining the Allied war effort in December 1941. A period of discord was to follow after the war ended. President Eisenhower was enraged by, and actively opposed, the joint Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt during the Suez Canal crisis of 1956. Under the prime ministerships of Harold Wilson and Edward Heath, Britain did not participate in combat operations in Vietnam (1965-1973). The US initially refused a British request for military assistance during the Falklands War of 1982, while the UK opposed the American invasion of Grenada the following year. The Anglo-American military alliance finally re-emerged during the First Gulf War (1990-1991), Afghanistan conflict (2001-2021), and the Second Gulf War (2003-2011).
Since the Second World War, the UK and US have been allies in matters of trade, diplomacy, defence, security, and intelligence sharing. This special relationship is becoming much less relevant in a world in which a new multipolar order is replacing the existing post-war global order. America remains a dominant superpower, while Britain’s influence has been declining for decades. The lovefests between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush and Tony Blair have yet to be replicated. If anything, Anglo-American relations have recently been put under added strain following Brexit and the adoption of a more confrontational American approach during the two presidential terms of Donald Trump. Nonetheless, following President Trump’s “historic Second State Visit to the United Kingdom”, the White House issued a statement on 19 September 2025 confirming that “The bond between the United States and the United Kingdom is like no other anywhere in the world, and we will always be friends.”
Setting aside the rhetoric, there can be little doubt that the much-vaunted special relationship is under threat from the changing power dynamics between the UK and US. It doesn’t help that the newly-appointed British ambassador to the US, Sir Christian Turner, informed a group of UK sixth-form students visiting America in early February 2026 that the special relationship is “quite nostalgic, it’s quite backward-looking, and has a lot of baggage about it.” He even suggested that the genuine special relationship is between the US and Israel. While President Trump may well revere the British monarchy, just as his mother also did, this does not necessarily translate into any potential gains for the UK in terms of tariffs, tax and trade agreements, or military cooperation under Trump 2.0.
Ashis Banerjee