In October 2019, Prime Minister Boris Johnson submitted a new proposal to the European Union (EU), with a view to getting Brexit “done” by the end of the month, on October 31. His “two borders four-year plan” had the crucial backing of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland. By this time, the long-drawn-out and very tedious process of disengagement of the UK from the EU had apparently been whittled down to the matter of regulating cross-border activity along the 310 miles that separate Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. With Brexit, this will become the only land border between the United Kingdom and the rest of the EU, and any changes here will also inevitably affect the post-Brexit status of Northern Ireland.
Johnson’s proposals involved Northern Ireland leaving the customs union along with the rest of the UK as of January 1 2021, while remaining in “regulatory alignment” with the EU single market regulations covering agriculture, food and manufactured goods until 2025 in the first instance. This would mean customs checks, including tariffs and rules of origin checks, on products being traded between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on the land border, as well as regulatory checks on trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain across the Irish Sea. These proposals were rapidly scrutinised, thoroughly criticised and soon rejected by the EU, forcing further dialogue and negotiation in order to secure an increasingly elusive deal.
So how has a situation involving the six counties of Northern Ireland, which accounts for just 3 per cent of the United Kingdom population, come to become such a sticking point in Brexit negotiations? This nation, which makes up the UK, along with Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales), has had an influence on British history and politics that is disproportionate to its small size. Sectarian tensions led to the “Troubles” of 1968 to 1998, during which 3,600 people died, further polarising society in a way not seen in the rest of the UK. The tortured political landscape of Northern Ireland was, and is, dominated by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sinn Fein, and Ulster Unionist Party, local parties without a significant voter base or political relevance elsewhere in the UK. Despite all its differences, Northern Ireland is considered to be an integral part of the UK, ensuring that any negotiations with the EU cannot be allowed to compromise its current status. To complicate matters, republican Sinn Fein MPs continue to refuse to take their seats in the House of Commons, as they do not recognise British sovereignty over Northern Ireland and continue to promote reunification of the island of Ireland.
The Northern Ireland Executive collapsed on January 9 2017, following unresolved disagreement between the DUP and Sinn Fein. The devolved Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont has ceased to function since then. The DUP that currently runs the Northern Irish government is committed to leave the EU along with the rest of the UK, even though the nation itself voted 55.78 per cent to “remain” in the 2016 referendum. Yet, at the same time, Northern Ireland retains substantial differences from the rest of the UK. It took legislation in Westminster to overturn the bans on both abortion, other than for “fatal or serious fetal anomaly,” and same-sex marriage, effective from October 22 2019.
What happens at the Northern Irish border post-Brexit remains unresolved. Cross-border traffic was freed up following the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement, which was signed by the UK and the Republic of Ireland on April 10, 1998 and followed by a dual referendum on May 22, in which the accord was approved by voters of both countries. Thereafter, economic integration between the two parts of the island of Ireland has strengthened over time. The possibility of significant changes to the arrangements at this border are hence a source of concern to those on both sides of it.
According to the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA), around 72 million road crossings take place across the border per year. Around 14 per cent of these crossings involve the transport of goods, which may have to traverse the border more than once to be processed prior to sale for consumption. Foodstuffs, beverages, livestock, dairy products, agri-food, and wood are among the most common goods to be conveyed across the border. A no-deal Brexit scenario will require checking at border inspection posts, of which there are currently two in Ireland (at Dublin port and at Shannon airport), of all live animals, products of animal origin, fish, shellfish, germplasm or fishery products coming from the UK to the Republic of Ireland.
Many small (with 10 to 49 employees) and micro (nine or fewer employees) businesses currently operate freely and engage in frictionless trade across the open Northern Irish border. Many businesses also have highly interconnected supply chains that may even extend across the entire island. Post-Brexit changes may compromise trade across the border, through the creation of a “hard” border, with the necessary physical infrastructure that accompanies customs checks.
What about the extent of cross-border trade? In 2017, Northern Ireland sent goods worth £11.3 billion to the UK, against £3.9 billion exported to the Republic of Ireland. Much of this trade involves smaller businesses. It seems likely that the biggest losers in Northern Ireland following a no-deal Brexit situation would be people working for small businesses in the border counties of Derry, Fermanagh and Tyrone.
Then there is also the issue of the free movement of people. Cross-border commuters, including British, Irish and other EU citizens, are likely to feel the impact of new migration controls as and when they are introduced.
Northern Ireland is economically disadvantaged, being the poorest region of the UK. Per capita GDP is 2.5 times higher in the Republic of Ireland. The nation will inevitably lose EU development funding for economic and social development after Brexit. But given that Northern Ireland is already heavily subsidised by the UK government, to the tune of £10.8 billion per year, the impact of this particular loss of financial support is likely to be absorbed by the Treasury.
The single most striking feature of the Northern Irish border question is the apparent lack of thought given to the issue over the years by those Eurosceptic politicians who have actively campaigned to leave the EU. It would appear that much policy is currently being thought up at short notice and failing to provide any acceptable solutions to the problems of the EU-UK border in Ireland. What finally emerges out of such an unpredictable and volatile situation is anybody’s guess.
Ashis Banerjee (dispassionate and unimpressed observer of the Brexit process)