The British government’s eagerly awaited immigration reforms were announced by the Home Secretary, Priti Patel, on 19 February 2019. A ten-page policy statement, published the same day, outlined the new immigration policy . This policy establishes a “level playing field”, with EU and non-EU applicants being treated equally for the first time. A version of the Australian points-based immigration system, designed to control further immigration into the UK, has been linked with the desire to make better use of home-grown “economically inactive” people. These new proposals are due to come in effect as of 1 January 2021, thereby imposing a tight deadline for the proposed programme of change.
Stricter immigration control has been a persistent theme of British politics since the mid-1950s. In the 1950s, the demands of the labour market in the UK, depleted following the Second World War, initiated successive waves of mass immigration. The demands of certain sectors, such as textile factories in the North of England, engineering firms in the Midlands, transportation (London Transport, British Rail) and healthcare (doctors and nurses in the NHS) led to targeted recruitment within some Commonwealth countries. The numbers of new arrivals were often further boosted by a process of chain migration, whereby people already in the UK were joined by their relatives and kinsfolk. Much of this migration was from the so-called New Commonwealth-the Indian subcontinent and the West Indies. At the peak of New Commonwealth immigration, the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962 removed the right of automatic entry to the UK and, foreshadowing the current proposals, introduced a system of work vouchers, which were eventually replaced by work permits in 1971. This historical pattern of migration has, in more recent times, been overshadowed by the free movement of workers from eastern Europe, leading to fresh demands for stricter immigration control.
The current immigration reforms are a direct consequence of the Brexit process. Apart from the frequently stated intention to regain “control” over borders and immigration, there is an overwhelming need to fine tune the numbers of new arrivals to the UK with the actual needs of the British labour market. But what do these new proposals actually promise? As expected, the responses have varied from broad acceptance to total rejection. It is now the time to examine the potential impacts in greater detail.
Those intending to work in the UK in the future will be required to have a job offer, which is dependent on attaining a score of at least 70 points, must be proficient in English, and must be able to pay both a visa fee of £1,220, as well as an annual health surcharge, of £400 per person. The salary being offered must be at least £25,600, which is lower than the previous salary threshold of £30,000, although in some shortage areas a salary “floor” of £20,480 will be accepted. These acceptable salary thresholds have been linked to a somewhat arbitrary valuation process, whereby the worth and the required “skill set” of specific types of jobs are defined indirectly by the salaries on offer. Bigger wages equate to better skills. Ostensibly, this is the government’s way of weeding out undesirable “non-skilled” and “low-skilled” labour. But at the same time, the skills threshold has been lowered from the possession of a graduate degree to the attainment of standards equivalent to A levels or Scottish Highers. In any case, non-skilled workers seeking opportunities for self-employment will no longer be able to travel to the UK of their own accord, looking for employment.
A stated preference for so-called “highly- skilled” migrants will mean that some sectors of the British workforce are likely to be disproportionately disadvantaged when it comes to filling vacancies. These include the construction sector, hospitality (hotels, restaurants, pubs), food and drink production, agriculture, and health and social care. In recognition of this potential pitfall, some jobs have been re-designated as being “skilled”, such as carpenters and plasterers, while concessions have been made in the case of others, in particular seasonal agricultural workers. On the other hand, certain forms of employment, such as waiters and waitresses and “elementary ” jobs in agriculture and fishing, no longer feature in the list of skilled occupations, despite a current heavy dependence on migrant workers.
So, how will any potential gaps in the job market caused by restricted immigration be filled? It appears that the UK has a surfeit of under-utilised home-grown people. Thus, a total of 8.5 million UK citizens, aged between 16 and 64, have been labelled as being “economically inactive”. According to the Office for National Statistics, this figure, however, includes 2.3 million students, 2.1 million long-term sick, 1.1 million retired and 1.9 million carers. Less than 1.9 million out of this large group of people are actually actively seeking employment. In addition, there is a pool of 3.2 million EU citizens able to stay and work in the UK, who are capable of being used flexibly. Whatever the actual number of people available, it is the belief that training by employers and providing other incentives to work will augment the workforce by better using these currently “unemployed” or “unproductive” people.
The proposals are lacking in detail about how any anticipated vacancies in certain sectors will be dealt with in the short-term, given the shortages that already exist. Furthermore, the recruitment of home-grown workers into less desirable, lower-paid and often repetitive jobs will almost certainly require wages to be raised to more acceptable levels, placing further pressure on smaller- and medium-sized businesses. The financial barriers imposed by high administrative fees may also deter potentially eligible skilled applicants from poorer countries. While controls on immigration are undeniably necessary, delivering on the proposed policies is likely to prove challenging, given the short time available.
Ashis Banerjee