On January 2 2020, Dominic Cummings, Chief Political Adviser to Prime Minister Boris Johnson, ushered in the New Year with a blog entitled “Two hands are a lot-we’re hiring data scientists, project managers, policy experts, associated weirdos”. The blog, which appeared on Cummings’ personal blog site, invited applicants with a range of skills and backgrounds to apply to work in Downing Street, some to become officials and the others merely “spads” (special advisers). The invitation was somewhat unorthodox, advising applicants to send in their CVs directly to ideasfornumber10@gmail.com for his perusal, with no guarantee of a response of any kind. The primary objective behind these new job opportunities is to seemingly widen the competencies and expertise that are currently available to government decision-makers, while simultaneously soliciting new ideas for change. The new workforce will hopefully facilitate large shifts in policy and alter the structure of decision-making, thereby allowing rapidly implementation of any ensuing changes, guided by efficient project management, and irrespective of any short-term unpopularity.
Cummings, a man in a hurry to get things done, appears to harbour an ambitious desire to radically overhaul the workings of Parliament, the Cabinet, and, in particular, those of Whitehall. Whitehall, the road that links Parliament Square with Trafalgar Square, is home to many British government departments and is synonymous with the country’s Civil Service. There has long been much suspicion about the workings of the “corridors of power” in the secretive institutions of Whitehall and beyond. While ministers come and go, and the two major political parties transfer the reins of power between one another, things in Whitehall seem to remain unchanged. A large body of mostly nameless and faceless bureaucrats, the backbone of what Cummings terms as “dysfunctional” institutions, wields a disproportionate amount of power. This bureaucracy is evidently able to stifle progress by delaying and even obstructing decision making on many fronts, as for example in the procurement of new projects or in the implementation of established ones.
Certain types of people are being targeted, with an emphasis on younger people and those with an aptitude for hard work, even to the detriment of their quality of life and work-life balance. Experience, per se, is relatively unimportant. According to Cummings, there is a great need for data scientists and software developers, economists, project managers, policy experts, communications experts, junior researchers, as well as associated “weirdos and misfits with odd skills”. It would seem that the goal is to achieve a system of evidence-based political decision-making, guided by data, mathematical models, dedicated software and artificial intelligence, and then to make a plausible case for innovation and change, aided by communications experts who are skilled in “the intersection of technology and story telling”.
Despite Cummings himself being the product of an independent education (Durham School) and the holder of a history degree from Exeter College in Oxford University, he displays an antipathy to public school-educated “bluffers” and Oxbridge graduates in the humanities. He has peppered his writings with the terminology of science. Words like complex systems, dynamic tools, artificial intelligence, neural net algorithms, mathematical modelling, game theory, cognitive technologies and computational infrastructure feature frequently in his blogs. His listed sources of potential learning include the hedge fund Bridgewater, along with several cited successful “megaprojects”. It appears that scientific decision-making and “high performance teams” are essential for any meaningful government policy change.
Despite holding an unassailable position in the higher echelons of power, Cummings appears to hold several refreshing iconoclastic and anti-establishment views. Many would share and support his ambition to drive change through at a faster pace, unimpeded by archaic Parliamentary practices, indecisive Cabinet meetings, and an obstructive Whitehall bureaucracy, as well as to prevent “corporate looters” from making undue gains from the public purse.
It, however, remains to be seen whether this is likely to be achieved through the processes as put forward by Cummings. Suitable applicants will have to come forward and then be chosen by as yet undefined procedures, which are susceptible to challenges from employment lawyers. This selection process will be challenging given that “I don’t really know what I’m looking for”. Some level of support will be required from existing civil servants and politicians. The precise means by which decisions are made within government will have to be defined and refined, within the bounds of the British Constitution. It is also easy to be seduced by mere, and sometimes dubious, numbers and by mathematical models, while ignoring the far-more important behavioural elements that influence humans faced with multiple options. The lessons of economics, in particular, frequently highlight the many failings of econometrics models. It is, for the moment, just a question of “watching this space”.
Ashis Banerjee (a paradigm shift, in some form, is required so as to overcome Parliamentary inertia and obfuscation)