Gyanvapi Masjid: An Indian Mosque with a Hindu Past, and the Wider Context of Contemporary Hindu-Muslim relations in India
The recent discovery, on 16 May 2022, of a 12-foot 8-inch stone shaft in a reservoir, during the third and final day of a videographic survey of the Gyanvapi Masjid-Shringar Gauri complex in Varanasi in northern India, has reignited tensions between Hindus and Muslims over their respective places of worship. This artefact has been identified as a Shivling, a phallic symbol of Lord Shiva, by Hindus in the know who seek to reinstate their right to worship on the mosque premises, while Muslims claim it is only a fountain with no particular religious connotations. The Gyanvapi (‘well of knowledge’), or Alamgiri, Masjid replaced that part of a Vishwanath temple, dedicated to Shiva and built during the reign of Akbar, third Mughal emperor, which was demolished on the orders of Aurangzeb, sixth Mughal emperor, in 1669. The Gyanvapi Masjid and Kashi Vishwanath Temple happen to stand side-by-side in the sacred city of Varanasi, on the banks of the Ganges in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. The matter is now in the hands of the Varanasi District and Sessions Court and may even end up in the Supreme Court of India. Whatever the eventual decision, in keeping with the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991 or otherwise, it is unlikely to equally satisfy both disputing parties.
The destruction of Hindu temples by Muslim invaders centuries ago, and their replacement by mosques, continues to arouse strong emotions in India today. The first Dharma Sansad (religious assembly) of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council), meeting in New Delhi on 7 and 8 April 1984, thus passed a resolution for the ‘liberation’ of three sites where mosques had been constructed on the sites of major Hindu temples: at Sri Rama Janma Bhoomi (Birthplace of Lord Rama) in Ayodhya, Sri Krishna Janmasthan (Birthplace of Lord Krishna) in Mathura, and Kashi Viswanath at Gyanvapi in Varanasi, all in the state of Uttar Pradesh. This was followed by a symbolic Rama Ratha Yatra (chariot journey) from Sitamarhi in Bihar on 25 September 1984, which reached Ayodhya on 6 October. The campaign for the demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya was fulfilled by its eventual destruction on 6 December 1992, under the watchful eyes of the police. Meanwhile, the first petition to build a temple in the Gyanvapi Masjid complex had been filed in October 1991. Prime Minister Narendra Modi laid the foundation stone for a Hindu temple at the Babri Masjid site in August 2020, thereby fulfilling an electoral pledge from June 1989, and all 32 persons accused of destroying the Babri Masjid were finally acquitted on 30 September 2020.
The 15th Census of 2011 (the 2021 Census is awaited) counted 172.2 million Muslims in India, accounting for 14.2 per cent of a total population of 1.21 billion and making it the third largest Muslim country by population in the world. India’s Muslims, 90 per cent of whom are Sunnis, are a heterogenous group, defined by differing languages and cultural traditions, rather than a homogeneous and unified community as is frequently believed. They are often depicted by the media, politicians, and members of the general public as disloyal to the Indian state, and considered fifth columnists, surreptitiously supporting Pakistan and radical Islamism over Indian national interests. This narrative is supported by particular interpretations of incidents such as the Pakistani-instigated terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in December 2001 and in Mumbai in November 2008. Anti-Muslim feelings are also stoked by fears of Hindus being overtaken by the faster growth rates and polygamy among Muslims, forced conversions, covert infiltrations of Bangladeshi and other alien Muslims into India, and even conspiracies to trick Hindu women into turning Muslim as part of a ‘Love Jihad’.
Despite India setting itself up as a secular democracy after Independence in 1947, there has been a resurgence of Hindu nationalism in India since the late 1980s. This ethnic nationalism can be traced back to socio-religious movements, such as the Arya Samaj (founded in 1875), which sought to preserve Hindu traditions while rejecting casteism as part of social reform to modernise the religion. The polytheistic, assimilative, and eclectic Hindu religion began to develop a new collective identity, bringing together a variety of beliefs under new political platforms, while also developing a formal ecclesiastical structure.
The Hindu Mahasabha (Hindu Grand Assembly) was set up in 1915, within the Hindu Sangathan (Organisation), and marked the beginnings of a militant collective Hindu consciousness. The concept of Hindutva was articulated by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in ‘Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? (1923), which united Hindus by territory, race, and a common culture. The territory of the Hindus was demarcated by the Indus River, the Himalayas, and the seas embracing the Indian Peninsula. Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, who was inspired by Hindutva, founded the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (Association of National Volunteers), a paramilitary outfit, in 1925. The RSS combined martial values and scriptural traditions, emphasising physical fitness, mental discipline, and ideological training for its volunteers. Hindu Mahasabha leader Dr Shyama Prasad Mookerjee left his party to found the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (Indian People’s Association) as the political wing of the RSS in October 1951. The Jan Sangh dissolved itself on 1 May 1977, forming part of the Janata Party (People’s Party) from 1977 to 1980, only to re-emerge as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) on 5 April 1980. India has been ruled by the BJP since 2014, which became the first major political party to come to power without a single Muslim MP. Hedgewar’s successor, Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar formed the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) in August 1964, which later set up a militant youth wing, the Bajrang Dal (Brigade of Hanuman), in May 1984.
Hindu nationalism and radical Islamism have come to occupy diametrically opposite positions within the political landscape of contemporary India. There are two major issues to consider in this context: the status and concerns of Muslims and the views and beliefs of the Hindu majority. The secular United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government-appointed Sachar Committee reported in November 2006 that Muslims had low levels of educational attainment and were economically disadvantaged, socially excluded, and under-represented in the public sector. This committee, along with the Mishra Commission (National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities), which reported in May 2007, recommended affirmative action to ensure equal opportunity for India’s Muslims and thereby improve their lot. Specific concerns of Muslims have also included the applicability of Muslim Personal Law in civil cases, the status of the Urdu language, the protection of Islamic endowments (waqf), and the autonomy of their educational institutions.
Measures to uplift Muslims have been countered by Hindu nationalist allegations that Muslims are being treated as a vote bank by secular parties, being appeased solely for political reasons. Muslims continue to be blamed for the actions of foreign invaders from the past, who desecrated Hindu places of worship and tried to impose Islam in place of what they considered an idolatrous and illegitimate faith. Pakistan’s mistreatment of religious minorities is unfavourably compared with India’s seeming tolerance for Muslims, which seems disproportionate and is not to the liking of many, if not most, Hindu nationalists.
Unfortunately, Hindu-Muslim disagreements have sometimes descended into unrestrained violence. The Partition of India was indeed marked by communal violence on an epic scale. After India gained independence in 1947, there was a period of relative calm for around fifteen years. Rioting in Jabalpur in February 1961 is considered a watershed, following which communal rioting has frequently reared its ugly head, especially in urban centres, most recently in New Delhi in February 2020. Given the large numbers of Muslims in India, there is no realistic option but to strive for peaceful coexistence, and it may well be that an emerging generation of liberal Hindus and Muslims may help promote a new era of constructive dialogue between the two communities in India’ s best interests. Predictions of future events often turn out to be wrong, but it seems preferable to err on the side of optimism whenever possible.
Ashis Banerjee