On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first UN member state to officially recognise the Republic of Somaliland since the latter entity unilaterally declared its independence in May 1991. The decision was celebrated on the streets of the capital city of Hargeisa, while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu engaged in a friendly online tête-à-tête with President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (aka Cirro). The spotlight soon turned on Israel’s decision to establish full diplomatic relations and conclude a bilateral trade agreement with the isolated state in the Horn of Africa. Gideon Sa’ar, Israel’s foreign minister, confirmed that the opening up of links with Somaliland was “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords, signed at the initiative of President-Trump”, under which Israel initiated diplomatic ties and commercial relations with a number of Arab and Muslim-majority states from 2020, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.
The de facto state of Somaliland, at the north-western corner of a formerly unified Somalia, is bordered by Djibouti to the northwest, Ethiopia to the west and south, and Somalia to the east. The coast of Somaliland lies along the southern edge of the Gulf of Aden. The strait of Bab al-Mandeb (“Gate of Tears”) at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden serves as one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, linking the Red Sea with the Arabian Sea. The UAE operates a military base in the seaport of Berbera, from where Houthi rebels in Yemen have been targeted in the past.
An isolated Somaliland has thrived under the radar over the past 34 years, developing its own constitution, parliament, judiciary, national anthem, flag, currency (shilling), and security forces. Elections have been deemed fair and free by international observers, while transfers of political power between parliamentary elections have remained relatively peaceful. Citizens carry identification cards and are issued with passports. Foreign visitors can be issued with visas in the neighbouring states of Djibouti and Ethiopia.
The unitary state of Somalia was formed by the union of the former Protectorate of Somaliland, which gained its independence from Britain on 26 June 1960, and the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration, which became independent on 1 July 1960. The partnership began to fall apart from the very outset, when a referendum on a unitary referendum on 20 June 1961 was boycotted by Somaliland’s major political party- the Somali National League. Under the leadership of General Mohamed Siad Barre, an unequal partnership led to growing tensions within Somaliland, where Barre targeted the dominant Isaaq clan in the aftermath of the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977 to 1978. Barre’s repression culminated in the so-called Hargeisa Holocaust of 1987 to 1989. The Somali National Movement (SNM), which had been formed in London in April 1981, eventually proclaimed independence on 18 May 1991.
Somaliland’s strategic position at the crossroads of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula and its relative political stability in a turbulent region have attracted attention for some time from global players. Project 2025, published by the conservative Heritage Foundation in the US in April 2023, thus proposed “the recognition of Somaliland statehood as a hedge against the US’s deteriorating position in Djibouti.” Somaliland itself claims to meet the criteria of statehood as established by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, and has official representatives to oversee its interests in more than twenty countries.
The opening up of direct links between Israel and Somaliland has been condemned by the Federal Republic of Somalia, as well as the African Union, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the East African Community; by Egypt, China, Türkiye, and other nations; and by terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab and the Houthis. The European Union has urged dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland in the face of a perceived threat to the territorial integrity of Somalia. Despite considerable conservative support within the US for the state of Somaliland, President Trump, conscious of American strategic interests in Somalia, rejected the possibility of following the Israelis in an interview with the New York Post, published on 26 December, even asking “Does anyone know what Somaliland is, really?”
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has been interpreted by opponents as a threat to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, with the potential to further destabilise the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, recognition is also being seen by those supportive of this measure as a reward for Somaliland’s adherence to democracy, self-reliance (without depending unduly on foreign aid), and its pro-Western policies. Israel could potentially benefit from a strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa, better access to the southern gateway to the Red Sea, the ability to monitor Houthi targets in western Yemen, and the provision of logistical support to Yemeni government forces. Israel’s Somaliland initiative will inevitably challenge those aspiring for Somali unity, but is unlikely to significantly alter the balance of power in the Red Sea region. Everything ultimately depends on the outcomes of a complex, volatile, and unpredictable geopolitical situation within the Horn of Africa.
Ashis Banerjee