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It was inevitable that, sooner or later, the messy Northern Ireland Protocol would have to be renegotiated to end the resulting economic fiasco and political stalemate north of the Irish land border, although progress toward this end was delayed by increasingly fractious relations between the UK and the EU. Rishi Sunak, Prime Minister of the UK, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, finally got together at the Fairmont Windsor Park Hotel in the Royal Borough of Windsor (and Maidenhead), on the penultimate day of February 2023- the day of the publication of the so-called “Windsor Framework.” In a show of unity, they then launched this new “legal and constitutional framework”, designed to supersede the original Protocol and with some concessions from both sides, at the town’s Guildhall. If the new proposals gain Parliamentary approval, which seems likely, the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill of June 2022 will be abandoned and the EU in turn will not proceed with seven separate ongoing legal actions against the UK. 

The Protocol has hindered economic and political activity within Northern Ireland. The movement of goods along “the principal arterial route of Northern Ireland’s economy”, linking it to its most important market in Great Britain, has been severely disrupted. At the same time, Unionist opposition has led to the indefinite suspension of the power-sharing arrangement, bringing the Northern Ireland legislature and government to a standstill.

The new framework hopes to achieve a “productive future relationship between the UK and EU”, while continuing to uphold the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of 1998. In doing so, it has focused on three particular areas. First of all, “smooth trade” within the UK internal market is to be achieved by the introduction of a green lane for goods labelled “not for EU”. This will involve amendments to Article 6 (2) of the Northern Ireland Protocol. A new UK internal trade scheme for goods, involving “Trusted Traders” and “Authorised Carriers’, based on commercial data sharing (sales invoices, transport contracts), and bypassing existing red tape and customs checks, will replace international customs processes currently in place.  Over 1,700 pages of EU law, covering standards for various goods, and public health, labelling and marketing regulations, will no longer apply to core UK trade. Tariff-free movements of all types of steel into Northern Ireland have been safeguarded. At the same time, goods destined for the EU will continue to be subject to full EU laws and regulatory controls. 

Secondly, Northern Ireland’s place within the UK will be “safeguarded.”  Free movement of agricultural products (fruit, vegetables, red meat, fish, poultry, dairy products) between Great Britain and Northern Ireland will ensure integration into the UK’s food supply chain, without the need for any further “grace period arrangements.” Customs checks on parcels will no longer be required. Unrestricted travel of microchipped pets (dogs, cats, ferrets) will be restored. Northern Ireland will benefit from UK-wide VAT cuts on energy-saving materials (solar panels, heat pumps) and imminent changes to alcohol duties. A UK-wide regime for approval and supply of medicines will allow the UK’s Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) to take over from the European Medicines Agency (EMA) to approve medicines for the NI market. 

Finally, the “democratic deficit”, by which Northern Ireland remains subject to EU legislation, will be addressed. A new “Stormont Brake” will apply to new or amended “EU customs, goods, and agriculture rules within the scope of the original Protocol.” This Brake may be triggered by a minimum of 30 members from two or more parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly, but only as a last resort-thereby discouraging its use. Any resulting UK veto can then be challenged, as necessary, through independent arbitration provided by a UK-EU Joint Committee, independent of the European Commission of Justice. 

The Windsor Framework can be considered as the beginning of a new phase of collaborative joint UK-EU working.  Sceptics within the Conservative Party will have to be placated and the Democratic Unionist Party’s seven Brexit deal tests will have to be met to secure support for this new framework, subject to their line-by-line scrutiny of the legal details. A sticking point is that the framework does include some concessions to the EU. While UK internal trade will be smoothened out, the EU will monitor this activity by real-time access to UK customs IT systems and databases. A hybrid border within the Irish Sea will remain, requiring customs checks for products destined from GB for the Republic of Ireland. The position of Northern Ireland within the Union will remain unique, as it continues to be subject to some EU laws and EU judicial oversight- the “minimum necessary”-in contrast with the other constituent nations of the UK. The Windsor Framework has come rather late in the day, and one wonders why it has taken so long to bring in somewhat underwhelming measures to tackle entirely foreseeable disruption to internal trade within the UK. The next steps are in the hands of the UK’s political leadership and parliamentarians. 

Ashis Banerjee