Urban Riots in England During the Summer of 2024: A Demonstration of the Irrepressible Power of Social Media
News of a heinous incident in the north-western English town of Southport on 29 July 2024, during which three young girls were fatally stabbed by an unnamed 17-year-old male, and another eight children and two adults injured, set social media platforms alight. It was soon being reported on X, Telegram, and elsewhere, that a certain ‘Ali Al-Shakati’, a 17-year-old Syrian “undocumented migrant”, who was “known to MI6” and had arrived by small boat within the year, was the culprit. Within no time, disrespecting the memories of the dead children and overshadowing the enormity of the tragedy, the news headlines were being dominated instead by riots that rapidly spread through large swathes of England, mostly in the north to begin with. Subsequent confirmation that the assailant was a 17-year-old born in Cardiff to Rwandan parents, who had moved to the Southport area in 2013, failed to defuse a dangerously escalating situation, even after he was charged with murder and attempted murder.
Shortly after a peaceful vigil to honour the victims of the knife attack began in Southport at 18:00 on 30 July 2024, a group of rough-and-ready agitators converged on the Southport Mosque and Islamic Cultural Centre. Projectiles were aimed at the mosque, as police officers defended the building as well as themselves with batons and plastic riot shields. A police van was set on fire. According to North West Ambulance Service, 27 police officers were taken to hospital, while another twelve of their counterparts were assessed, treated, and discharged at the scene. A 24-hour Section 60 Order was set in place, giving the police extra stop-and-search powers, while a Section 34 dispersal notice aimed to keep those engaging in, or “likely to become involved” in antisocial activity, out of the area. It was reported that many rioters had come from elsewhere to participate in the “protests.”
Rioting behaviour spread like wildfire. The following day, 111 rioters were arrested in central London, while Aldershot, Hartlepool, and Manchester witnessed scenes of mayhem.
Liverpool and Sunderland followed suit on 2 August. A Citizens’ Advice Bureau office was targeted in Sunderland. By 3 August, unrest had spread to Blackpool, Belfast, Bristol, Hull, Leeds, Manchester, Portsmouth, Preston, Stoke-on-Trent, and Weymouth. Spellow Lane Library Hub, which doubles as a food bank, was set on fire in Liverpool. On 4 August, windows were smashed at Holiday Inn Express buildings in Rotherham and Tamworth, believed to be housing asylum seekers, while agitators turned out in force in Bolton and Middlesbrough.
Two prevailing narratives emerged. Supporters of the rioters considered them to be “patriots”- a vocal minority speaking on behalf of a “silent majority”, concerned about the adverse impact of mass immigration and cross-channel arrivals by small boats on British society. In their view, many immigrants had failed to integrate in the host community and to accept British “values”, and multiculturalism was a failed project. Their detractors, on the other hand, believed that the rioters were mindless “far-right thugs”, intent on fomenting discord. According to this latter narrative, a combination of white nationalists, cultural nationalists, Islamophobes, opportunistic criminals, as well as less militant, yet deeply concerned, members of the general public had stoked up trouble. Some even considered the events to be akin to “domestic terrorism.”
Some common themes were noted. Photographic and video images of the events, confirmed by verbal and written reports, depicted crowds of White people, some draped in St George banners, others hidden behind balaclavas and facemasks or sporting hoodies, and yet others displaying bare torsos, taking to the streets and engaging in random violence, taunting bystanders, making provocative gestures, and filming their exploits on their smartphones. Long and warm summer days and a surfeit of alcohol promoted violent behaviour, with some participants openly carrying cans of beer to prove the point. Projectiles (bricks, bottles, chairs, eggs, fireworks, rocks, planks of wood, and assorted street furniture) were directed at police officers, who were also sprayed with fire extinguishers; windows were smashed; shops were looted; fires were started; cars and vans were overturned and set alight; and mosques and hotels believed to be housing asylum seekers were attacked. Many police officers were injured. Anger at the police partly arose in protest over “two-tier policing”, which apparently favours Black and Minority Ethnic people over indigenous Whites. In some locations, anti-fascist groups engaged in counter-protests, thereby reducing the destructive impact of planned riots.
These summer riots are the most recent manifestation of festering, deep-rooted, anti-immigrant sentiments in British society, ever since the arrival of New Commonwealth migrants in the 1950s and 1960s. In keeping with the seriousness of the situation, a COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Room A) meeting was chaired by Home Secretary Yvette Cooper on 5 August to help coordinate government action. Unfortunately, despite the tough and uncompromising rhetoric of the Prime Minister, there can be no quick fix for the problems of a racially-divided Britain. In the best interests of the nation, hopes of a better outcome must nonetheless prevail over despair at the current state of affairs.
Ashis Banerjee