President Trump’s Latest Ukraine ‘Strategy’: An Example of Decision-Making on the Hoof
According to a CNN fact-checking exercise, Donald Trump promised, on at least 53 occasions during the 2024 Presidential campaign, to end the Ukraine war within 24 hours were he to become president in January 2025. Although he proved successful in the election, the consummate dealmaker has, however, so far failed to deliver on this promise. Come October 2026, the conflict shows no signs of abating, while Trump continues to shift his stance in an increasingly desperate attempt to bring about a cessation of hostilities. A background of unwavering Democratic support for Ukraine and the involvement of Ukraine in Trump’s first impeachment hearing in December 2019 provide sufficient reason for the President’s apparent preference for Russia on several recent occasions.
On 18 September 2026, President Trump signed into law the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, named for the pro-Ukrainian Republican Senator from South Carolina who had died unexpectedly on 11 July, shortly after returning from Ukraine. The bill gained substantial bipartisan support and was passed by an 81-11 margin in the Senate on 7 August, and a 262-159 margin in the House of Representatives on 16 September. In yet another example of economic coercion aimed at ending the Ukraine war, the Act’s various wide-ranging measures included increased tariffs on all products from Russia and sanctions on the Russian shadow fleet and other Russian entities. But just two days before the Act was to be implemented, Trump signed an Executive Order on 16 October waiving sanctions and restrictions against Russia-“in the national interests of the United States.” Preparations for this volte face had already begun on 9 October, when the President temporarily lifted sanctions on Russian diesel in an attempt to help bring down record-high domestic diesel prices. On 11 October, Trump even announced, on Truth Social, an “energy ceasefire” between Ukraine and Russia, which had not been agreed to by either party.
The changing US approach to the conflict has been defined by actions which have seemed to favour Russia at the expense of Ukraine. The deliberate degradation of the Starshield service, a US government-controlled encrypted satellite internet service provided by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, thus reduced transmission speeds on the system. Disruption of high-speed guidance communications hindered Ukraine’s ability to receive early warning of, and then intercept, incoming Russian missiles.
Ukraine’s intelligence services have traditionally worked closely with the CIA, whose Kyiv station has been operational since at least 2014. The sharing of intelligence provides Ukraine with information about the locations of Russian missile launchers and advance warning of Russian missile attacks. Trump has leveraged American intelligence support for Ukraine in the past, as shown by its temporary suspension in February 2025. The Trump administration subsequently threatened to suspend intelligence sharing in September 2026, in response to Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure. On 20 October 2026, however, following a meeting with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff in Oslo, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed the resumption of intelligence sharing.
America has blocked the transfer of Patriot (Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target) ground-based air and missile defence systems, thereby compromising Ukraine’s air defences. Part of the reason for this seems to be that these interceptors are in short supply worldwide. Ukraine normally purchases Patriot missiles via the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), with financial support from the EU. According to recent reports, Ukraine has run out of supplies.
Setting aside the vexatious matter of America’s involvement in Ukraine, the domestic political situation and the impact of institutional corruption on the Ukrainian war effort are also worthy of attention. Stirrings of discontent with Zelenskyy, who has held onto power under a state of martial law, have emerged. Disagreements over military strategy led to the dismissal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov on 15 July 2026, followed by General Oleksandr Syrskii, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine six days later. A series of corruption scandals have highlighted malpractices related to energy contracts, defence procurement, military recruitment, and the construction sector, while some state functionaries have been implicated in money-laundering schemes. Zelenskyy has lost a number of leading allies and even tried back in July 2025, albeit unsuccessfully, to limit the power of Ukraine’s anti-corruption organisations.
Despite his threatening bluster and grandiose rhetoric, Trump’s approach to Ukraine comes across as weak, vacillating, and lacking in direction, while his chosen Special Envoys seem somewhat unsuited to the challenging task of skilled diplomatic negotiation. The American President’s Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, by contrast, has gained the upper hand following recent negotiations. From his new position of strength, Putin has shown that he has considerable leverage over Trump and his suggestion of a trilateral summit between the US, Russia, and China, leaving out Ukraine and the EU, remains a possibility. Trump currently sees Zelenskyy as the villain in the matter, failing to deliver peace despite massive American financial and military support and allegedly reluctant to negotiate a ceasefire and surrender territory to Russia. The only real victims, meanwhile, are civilians and civic infrastructure in both Ukraine and Russia, whose fate lies in the hands of their respective leaders as they continue to engage in unremitting drone and missile warfare. With Trump as a key player in the Ukraine conflict, the only thing that is certain is uncertainty itself, and while a week in politics may be a long time, nowadays even a day can seem far too long.
Ashis Banerjee